The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future by Taylor, John & Silver, Josh
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 53 
Issue 2 The Community Reinvestment Act: Still 
Relevant at 30? 
Article 2 
January 2008 
The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and 
Looking to the Future 
John Taylor 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
Josh Silver 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the 
Future, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 203 (2008-2009). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
JOHN TAYLOR AND JOSH SILVER
Th e Community Reinvestment Act at 30: 
Looking Back and Looking to the Future
ABOUT THE AUTHORS:  John Taylor is President and CEO at the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition (“NCRC”), and Josh Silver is NCRC’s Vice President of Research & Policy.  The NCRC is an 
association of more than 600 community-based organizations that promote access to basic banking services, 
including credit and savings to create and sustain affordable housing, job development, and vibrant 
communities for America’s working families.  Its members include community reinvestment organizations, 
community development corporations, local and state government agencies, faith-based institutions, 
community organizing and civil rights groups, minority and women-owned business associations, and local 
and social service providers from across the nation.
203
204
INTRODUCTION
 The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) is a comprehensive law that has 
leveraged substantial amounts of loans, investments, and bank services for the ben-
efit of minority and working-class neighborhoods.  It has been indispensable in 
creating and maintaining affordable housing and economic development in low- and 
moderate-income (“LMI”) communities nationwide.  As we recently celebrated the 
CRA’s thirtieth anniversary, this article will describe how the CRA works, its ac-
complishments to date, and ways in which policy makers can contribute to its 
continued effectiveness.
 Passed in 1977, the CRA imposes a “continuing and affirmative obligation” on 
banks to “help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are 
chartered.”1  Congress passed the CRA in response to the practice of “redlining,” or 
the refusal of banks to lend in minority and working-class communities.  Not only 
has the CRA successfully held back discrimination, it has required banks to proac-
tively assess and serve community needs.  The CRA’s mandate to serve needs in a 
safe and sound manner has been vital and is especially important today as our nation 
faces a foreclosure crisis caused in substantial part by irresponsible lending.  CRA-
covered depository institutions (banks and thrifts) have been shown to have engaged 
in less risky lending than institutions not covered by the CRA.
 Sections I and II of this article will first discuss how the CRA works and the 
CRA’s accomplishments to date.  Sections III, IV, and V of the article will discuss 
how to strengthen CRA by improving the CRA examination process, ratings system, 
and merger application process.  Sections VI and VII will examine the adequacy of 
anti-discrimination reviews on CRA exams and advocate for more frequent CRA 
exams for small banks.  It will also discuss how the CRA could be applied to non-
bank financial institutions as well as the need to extend the CRA to non-bank 
financial institutions.  A number of the suggestions for bolstering the CRA are pro-
visions from the CRA Modernization Act of 2007.2  The Conclusion will offer an 
outline of the proposals for improvement set out in this article.
I. HOW THE CRA WORKS
 The CRA statute requires four federal agencies to conduct CRA evaluations and 
to consider depository institutions’ CRA performance when depository institutions 
apply for permission to merge or open bank branches.  The four agencies that con-
duct CRA exams are the Federal Reserve Board (for state-chartered banks), the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (for nationally-charted banks), the Office 
of Thrift Supervision (for federally chartered thrifts), and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (for state-charted banks and thrifts).  A CRA exam evaluates 
the extent to which banks respond to local community needs and assigns a rating 
based on the federal agency’s assessment of the bank’s responsiveness to needs.  CRA 
1. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
2. See Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2007, H.R. 1289, 110th Cong. (2007).  NCRC 
worked closely with the staffs of Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-Tex.) and Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D-Ill.) 
in the drafting of the bill.
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exams and ratings are publicly available.3  The agencies conduct CRA exams for 
banks with assets above $250 million once every two or three years.  Banks with as-
sets below $250 million undergo CRA exams once every four or five years.4  Banks 
receive one of four ratings: “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory,” “Needs to improve,” and 
“Substantial non-compliance.”  The last two are considered failing CRA ratings.5
 CRA exams differ according to the asset size and type of bank undergoing ex-
amination.  Exams differ according to bank size as follows.  Large banks with assets 
of more than $1 billion undergo the most rigorous exams comprising the following 
component parts:
Lending Test—an evaluation of the extent to which various loans are reaching • 
LMI borrowers and neighborhoods.  Loans include home and small business 
loans and community development loans.
Investment Test—an evaluation of the number and responsiveness of investments • 
in LMI neighborhoods.  These include investments in Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credits or Small Business Investment Corporations.
Service Test—an evaluation of a bank’s provision of branching and bank services • 
in LMI neighborhoods.6
 Intermediate small banks—banks with assets between $250 million to $1 bil-
lion—have a streamlined CRA exam that consists of a lending test and a community 
development test only.7  The community development test combines elements of the 
investment and service tests.8  Small banks with assets below $250 million have an 
even more streamlined CRA exam that consists only of a lending test.
3. See, e.g., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, http://www.ffiec.gov/craratings/default.
aspx. (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
4. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 mandates that the frequency of CRA exams for small banks 
with assets below $250 million depends on their most recent rating.  Small banks with a “Satisfactory” 
rating will undergo a CRA exam in four years; small banks with an “Outstanding” rating will undergo 
a CRA exam in five years.  See 12 U.S.C. § 2908 (2006).
5. Although “Needs to improve’”and “Substantial non-compliance” are both considered to be failing 
ratings, “Substantial non-compliance” is a lower level of performance.  For example, the appendix to the 
CRA regulations uses the adjective “very poor” to describe “Substantial non-compliance” performance 
while “poor” describes “Needs to improve” performance.  12 C.F.R. pt. 345, app. A (2008).
6. A large bank can score “Low” or “High Satisfactory” on its component tests but its overall rating is 
limited to the four ratings stated above.
7. Intermediate small bank asset levels are adjusted every year to account for inf lation.  For the most recent 
adjustment, see Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,571, 72,574 (Dec. 5, 2007) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 563e).
8. For a more complete description of exams for intermediate small banks, see Josh Silver & Richard 
Marsico, An Analysis of the Implementation and Impact of the 2004–2005 Amendments to the Community 
Reinvestment Act Regulations: The Continuing Importance of the CRA Examination Process, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. 271 (2008).
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 CRA tests also differ according to the type of bank being examined.  Banks that 
do not accept retail deposits and have narrow product lines such as credit card lending 
(wholesale or limited purpose banks) are evaluated based on the quality and quantity 
of their community development lending and investments.9  Finally, any bank or 
thrift can opt for a strategic plan in lieu of a CRA exam.  Within a strategic plan, a 
depository institution provides numerical targets for its lending, investments, and 
services; the federal agency evaluates the extent to which that depository institution 
meets its goals.
 When a bank wishes to merge with another bank or open an additional branch 
or branches, it must submit an application to the appropriate federal agency.  The 
federal agency considers a variety of factors in deciding the application, including a 
banks’ record in serving the convenience and needs of communities under the CRA. 
A federal agency can deny or delay a merger or branch application based on poor 
performance in meeting any of the factors considered in the application process. 
Denials of merger applications on CRA grounds are rare, but delays occasionally 
occur while a bank answers various questions about its past CRA performance or 
makes specific promises to improve CRA performance.  A federal agency can issue a 
conditional approval of a merger application under which an application is approved, 
but a bank is required to take certain steps to address a CRA or other deficiency.
 The public comment process is a vital component of CRA exams and reviews of 
bank applications.  Community organizations and members of the general public can 
comment on CRA exams and merger applications.  Because federal agencies are re-
quired to consider public comments in issuing CRA ratings and rendering decisions 
on merger applications, community groups can have practical impacts on ratings and 
merger outcomes.  Thus, public input on CRA exams can spur banks to improve 
their CRA performance.
II. THE CRA’S RECORD IN INCREASING ACCESS TO BANK LENDING AND SERVICES 
 The CRA has leveraged substantial numbers of loans, investments, and bank 
services for the benefit of LMI communities through its public accountability mech-
anisms.  In addition, banks have realized that lending, investing, and serving LMI 
communities is a profitable way of doing business.
 According to publicly available data analyzed by NCRC, banks and thrifts (de-
pository institutions) have made over 340,000 community development loans totaling 
more than $344 billion since 1996.  From 1996 to 2006, the annual dollar amount of 
community development loans increased by 219%—from $17.7 billion to $56.5 bil-
lion respectively.  During this same period, depository institutions also made 
12,433,172 small business loans in LMI neighborhoods totaling more than $513 bil-
lion.
9. The discussion in this section is based on the CRA regulation, see 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006), the 
interagency Question and Answer document, see 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,624–52 (July 12, 2001), 
available at http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/qnadoc.htm, and NCRC’s CRA Manual, available at http://www.
ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/cra_manual.pdf. 
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 The CRA merger application process has motivated banks to make $4.6 trillion 
in CRA agreements and commitments to LMI and minority communities.  As de-
scribed in NCRC’s CRA Commitments publication, CRA agreements are often 
negotiated between banks and community groups during the merger application 
process.  Banks seek to demonstrate to the federal agencies and the public-at-large 
that their lending and investing after a merger will increase.  Banks therefore issue 
CRA commitments, pledging to offer specific numbers of affordable home loans, 
small business loans, community development investments, and branches in work-
ing-class and minority communities.10
 Overall, banks make considerably more home loans in geographical areas covered 
by CRA agreements than those that are not.11  This was documented in a study con-
ducted by Federal Reserve economists using NCRC’s CRA database.  The incentives 
provided by CRA encourage banks to seek out opportunities in previously under-
served markets.  According to the Treasury Department, CRA-covered lenders 
increased home mortgage loans to LMI borrowers by 39% from 1993 to 1998.  This 
10. See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., CRA Commitments 7 (2007), available at http://www.ncrc.
org/images/stories/whatWeDo_promote/cra_commitments_07.pdf.
11. Raphael W. Bostic & Breck L. Robinson, Do CRA Agreements Influence Lending Patterns?  31 Real Est. 
Econ. 23, 23 (2003).
CRA Community Development Lending
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increase is more than twice that experienced by middle- and upper-income bor-
rowers during the same period (17%).12  Likewise, a study by the Joint Center for 
Housing Studies at Harvard University estimates that without the CRA, 336,000 
fewer home purchase loans would have been made to LMI borrowers and communi-
ties between 1993–2000.13  The study also reveals that banks issue a greater number 
of loans to LMI borrowers in geographical areas covered by CRA exams than in 
areas not covered by the exams.14
 The CRA’s effectiveness can also be measured by comparing the lending patterns 
of CRA-covered banks and non-CRA covered lending institutions.  Data suggests 
that banks make a greater percentage of their loans to minorities and LMI borrowers 
than non-CRA covered mortgage companies and credit unions.  NCRC’s analysis of 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data found that CRA-covered deposi-
tory institutions made 5.8% of their home purchase loans to low-income borrowers, 
while non-CRA lenders issued only 4.8% of these loans to the same group in 2005. 
Depository institutions and non-CRA covered lenders made 25.1% and 23.8% of 
their home purchase loans respectively to low- and moderate-income borrowers in 
2005.  Also, in 2006, depository institutions extended 23.5% of home purchase loans 
to LMI groups, whereas non-CRA covered lenders extended 21.5%.15
 NCRC’s study in 2005, Credit Unions: True to Their Mission, shows that over the 
three-year time period of 2001 through 2003, banks consistently outperformed credit 
unions in offering home loans to minorities, women, and LMI borrowers in a ma-
jority of states.16  The study also found that in Massachusetts (one of two states with 
CRA requirements for credit unions) state-chartered credit unions that followed the 
CRA guidelines served LMI, minorities, and female borrowers at a rate significantly 
greater than non-CRA federally-chartered credit unions.
 The CRA has remained true to its statutory purpose of requiring banks to serve 
credit needs consistent with safety and soundness.17  In fact, the CRA can be an 
important antidote to the predatory and unsafe lending that has contributed to the 
12. Robert E. Litan, Nicholas P. Retsinas, Eric S. Belsky & Susan White Haag, The Community 
Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report (2000), available at 
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/crareport.pdf.
13. See Joint Ctr. For Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., The 25th Anniversary of the Community 
Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System 59 (2002), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra02-1.pdf (noting that 
CRA lenders originated 42,000 more loans each year on average than would have been originated 
without CRA).
14. Id.  Banks are generally not subject to CRA exams in geographical areas in which they engage in 
lending through brokers, as opposed to branches.
15. The data reported here is based on NCRC’s calculations of the HMDA data.
16. Press Release and Study, NCRC, Credit Unions: True to their Mission? 4 (May 19, 2005) (on file with 
NCRC).
17. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Performance and Profitability of CRA-
Related Lending 89 (2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/   
craloansurvey/cratext.pdf.
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current foreclosure crisis.  In its review of HMDA data, the Federal Reserve has 
found that home loans issued by banks are significantly less likely to be high-cost 
and exhibit risky features such as piggyback lending than those made by non-bank 
institutions.18  The Federal Reserve Board showed that 34.3% of the home purchase 
loans issued by non-CRA covered lenders were high cost loans in 2005.19  By con-
trast, only 5.1% of the home purchase loans issued by depository institutions that 
were closely scrutinized on CRA exams were high cost.  These findings were cor-
roborated by Traiger & Hinckley LLP which observed that 33.5% of the loans issued 
by non-CRA covered lenders were high-cost, as opposed to only 11.5% of the home 
purchase loans issued by CRA covered institutions in 2006.20
 Research has not fully explained why CRA-covered institutions issue fewer high-
cost loans, but it confirms that they do.  One factor may be that CRA-covered 
institutions are subject to a higher level of regulatory scrutiny than non-CRA cov-
ered institutions, including fair lending and safety and soundness evaluations. 
Compliance with the law and keeping a good reputation and relationships in the 
community may be sufficient motivating factors for banks to lend responsibly.
 Another factor may be that the CRA encourages institutions to holistically meet 
community needs—from lending for homeownership to rental housing, basic 
banking, and small business lending.  Under this rubric, banks are awarded points on 
CRA exams for preparing borrowers carefully for home loans by encouraging savings 
and by providing quality homeownership counseling.  Non-CRA-covered institu-
tions, by contrast, are not similarly encouraged to carefully respond to such needs nor 
to prepare community residents for homeownership.
 While it is true that by holding depository institutions publicly accountable for 
meeting community credit needs the CRA process has resulted in increased access to 
credit and capital, improvements can and should be made to the entire process. 
Below, we discuss improvements that we believe are needed in CRA exams, the ap-
plication process, and the responsiveness of banks and regulatory agencies to public 
input.
III. HOW TO IMPROVE THE EXAMINATION PROCESS AND CRITERIA
 To this point, we have demonstrated that the CRA’s public accountability mech-
anisms have leveraged lending, investments, and services that benefit LMI 
communities.  Yet, the full potential of the CRA has yet to be realized.  While the 
overall framework of the CRA has been successful, certain aspects of the exam pro-
cedures are in need of reform so that the CRA can continue to be effective and grow 
18. In piggyback lending, borrowers simultaneously receive a first-lien mortgage and a junior-lien loan. 
Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2007 HMDA Data, available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/hmda07draft.pdf.
19. Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, Higher Priced Home Lending and the 2005 
HMDA Data, 2006 Fed. Res. Bull A123.
20. Warren W. Traiger, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly to the Foreclosure Crisis, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 227, 230 (2008).
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to realize its potential.  The CRA Modernization Act of 2007 contains necessary 
reforms for various procedures.  In other cases, such as enhanced analysis of bank 
branching and improved data, the federal regulatory agencies could directly imple-
ment the improvements suggested by NCRC without waiting for Congress to pass 
legislation.
 Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
A. Assessment Areas
 Assessment areas are the geographical locations covered by CRA exams and gen-
erally consist of metropolitan areas or counties that contain the bank and its branches. 
When Congress enacted the CRA in 1977, banks received deposits and made loans 
through branches, and the majority of bank lending occurred through these branches. 
Today, banks utilize diverse channels for lending.  While some banks still issue loans 
predominantly through branches, many others make the majority of their loans 
through brokers, correspondents, and other non-branch means.21
 Though the CRA regulation stipulates that assessment areas include geograph-
ical regions containing bank branches, the regulation also states that assessment areas 
shall include geographical regions surrounding branches in which the bank has orig-
inated or purchased a substantial portion of its loans.22  Despite the clarity of this 
regulatory clause, the federal agencies have largely adopted a narrow definition of 
assessment areas for banks or thrifts that issue most of their loans through non-
branch channels.  For these banks, it is not unusual to encounter CRA exams that 
cover only the geographical area of a bank’s headquarters, thereby focusing on just a 
small percentage of a bank’s lending patterns.
 Data reveals that discriminatory and unsafe practices are more likely to occur 
when CRA exams have narrow assessment areas.  In 2007, NCRC identified several 
lending institutions engaged in questionable practices, including: refusal to make 
loans under a minimum loan amount (usually $75,000 or $100,000), refusal to make 
loans to row homes, and failure to offer loans within entire cities (such as Baltimore 
and Philadelphia).  For the banks engaged in these policies and practices, only 11 to 
13% of the loans investigated were in the exam’s assessment areas.23
 Occasionally, federal agencies will review a sample of loans outside assessment 
areas to determine whether lending performance overall remains consistent with 
lending inside assessment areas.  But the agencies sampled loans outside the assess-
ment areas for only one of the four banks that NCRC investigated.24  In general, the 
21. See Joint Ctr. For Hous. Studies, supra note 13, at 13.
22. 12 C.F.R § 345.41 (2008).
23. The data is on file with NCRC.
24. See Office of Thrift Supervision, CRA Performance Evaluation of Eastern Savings Bank, Docket 
#08183 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/cra/CRAE_08183_20050822_64.rtf 
(noting that one institution for which the agencies examined lending outside of the assessment area was 
Eastern Savings Bank).
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reviews of lending outside of assessment areas have not been satisfactory.  The sample 
of loans reviewed usually consists of a small percentage of a bank’s total loans.25
 A bill introduced in the House of Representatives, HR 1289 or the CRA 
Modernization Act of 2007, addresses the inadequacies of assessment areas.26  Under 
this bill, if a bank has captured one half of one percent or more of the local lending 
market, a CRA exam would be obligated to consider the geographical area served by 
the bank as an assessment area.  A procedure such as this would ensure that a ma-
jority of a bank’s loans were scrutinized by CRA exams.  The majority of a bank’s 
loans and purchases should be included on CRA exams so that the exams can effec-
tively ensure that the loans are serving LMI populations in a safe, sound, and 
non-discriminatory manner.
B. Affiliates
 Under current CRA rules, a bank has the option of including its non-depository 
affiliates, such as mortgage companies, when responding to CRA exams.  This pro-
cedure often leads to the “cherry picking” of affiliates to be included on CRA exams. 
Banks are tempted to include affiliates on CRA exams if the affiliates perform ad-
mirably but will opt against inclusion if the affiliates are engaged in risky lending or 
discriminatory policies.  This runs counter to the essential purpose of CRA, which is 
to ensure that the institution as a whole is meeting credit needs responsibly.
 Four non-depository affiliates of banks were identified by NCRC’s fair lending 
investigations (discussed above) to be engaging in redlining or other discriminatory 
practices.  These four affiliates were not included on their bank’s CRA examina-
tions.  Current CRA examination procedures enable banks’ affiliates to engage in 
such practices undetected.  The CRA Modernization Act of 2007 would end this 
serious gap in CRA enforcement by mandating the inclusion of affiliates on CRA 
exams.
Combined Effects of Inadequate Procedures for Assessment Areas and Affiliates
 Inadequate procedures for assessment areas and affiliates often result in CRA 
exam coverage of only a small percentage of loans made by major lenders.  NCRC’s 
analyses have shown that in terms of the greatest number of loans issued, fewer than 
five of the top twenty lenders in a metropolitan area typically have a CRA exam 
measuring a bank’s performance in that metropolitan area.  In some cases, banks can 
represent half or more of the top twenty lenders, but their CRA exams’ assessment 
areas do not examine results in that metropolitan area.  Also, non-depository affili-
ates can be excluded from their CRA exams.27
25. See, e.g., Office of Thrift Supervision, CRA Performance Evaluation of Citicorp Trust Bank, Docket 
#14470 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/cra/CRAE_14470_20070212_64.rtf 
(noting that just 21% of nationwide lending was scrutinized on the exam).
26. See Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2007, H.R. 1289, 110th Cong. (2007).
27. For example, in the Birmingham, Alabama, metropolitan area, NCRC found that of the 36,956 
originations and purchases made by the top twenty lenders in 2006, only 3,456 or 9.4% were scrutinized 
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 The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University conducted a na-
tional study with results that mirrored NCRC’s analyses.  The study found that just 
under 30% of the home purchase loans issued in 2000 were made by CRA institu-
tions in CRA assessment areas.28
 Fundamentally, the inadequate procedures for assessment areas and affiliates lead 
to the failure of federal agencies to implement the CRA’s statutory purpose.  The 
CRA intends that banks meet the credit needs of all communities in which they 
operate.  Therefore, it is not sufficient for CRA exams to cover a minority of loans of 
a bank and its affiliates.
C. Minority Borrowers and Communities 
 A bank’s lending to LMI borrowers and communities is examined in detail on 
the lending test component of CRA exams.  A major part of the lending test consists 
of scrutinizing the percentage of a bank’s loans made to LMI borrowers compared 
with a) the demographics of the bank’s community and b) the percentage of loans 
made to LMI borrowers issued by a bank’s competitors.  Tables in the exam provide 
a breakdown of these figures for home purchase lending, refinance lending, home 
improvement lending, and small business lending.
 CRA exams have a fair lending component that assesses whether a bank has dis-
criminated by rejecting qualified minority applicants or by steering minorities with 
good credit to subprime loans.  While the fair lending review is necessary, it does not 
scrutinize whether banks are affirmatively making loans to minorities.  In other 
words, a bank can employ non-discriminatory policies but still make relatively few 
loans to minorities because it does not actively market to minority communities.  It 
may pass its fair lending review because it treated the few minorities who have ap-
plied to them for loans fairly, but it may still make very low percentages of its loans 
to minorities.  If lending to minorities were made an explicit assessment criterion on 
CRA exams, consistently low percentages of loans to minorities in all loan types and 
geographical areas would contribute to a lower rating for the bank.
 Given the evidence of lending disparities by race, NCRC has called for CRA 
exams to explicitly examine lending and other services to minority borrowers and 
communities.  In our Broken Credit System report, we show that minority neighbor-
hoods received larger percentages of subprime loans than predominantly white 
neighborhoods, even after controlling for creditworthiness and other housing stock 
characteristics.29  Federal Reserve economists came to similar conclusions about high 
levels of subprime loans in minority neighborhoods after controlling for creditwor-
by CRA exams.  Moreover, nineteen of the top twenty lenders were banks and non-depository affiliates 
of banks.  Eleven of the largest institutions were banks.  Of these eleven banks, only three of the banks’ 
CRA exams included Birmingham as an assessment area.  (Data on file with NCRC).
28. Joint Ctr. For Hous. Studies, supra note 13, at 5.
29. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., The Broken Credit System: Discrimination and Unequal 
Access to Affordable Loans by Race and Age 6–7 (2003), available at http://www.ncrc.org/
images/stories/pdf/research/ncrcdiscrimstudy.pdf.
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thiness.30  In our more recent report in 2007, Income Is No Shield Against Racial 
Differences in Lending, NCRC found that racial disparities in high-cost lending are 
great when comparing middle- and upper-income minorities with middle- and up-
per-income whites.31  Finally, another NCRC study, Are Banks on the Map?, finds 
greater disparities in bank branches by race of neighborhood than by income of 
neighborhood in twenty-five large metropolitan areas.32  In other words, the study 
found a small percentage of branches in minority neighborhoods compared with 
people in those neighborhoods; the gap between branches and neighborhoods was 
not as pronounced when considering low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in 
the metropolitan areas examined.  NCRC hypothesizes that a lack of analysis in 
CRA exams of the racial makeup of neighborhoods has contributed to the greater 
disparities found in branches by race than by income of neighborhood.
 Before the CRA regulatory reforms in the mid-1990s, CRA exams would often 
use HMDA data to assess performance of lending to minorities.33  The changes to 
the CRA regulation in the mid-1990s simultaneously streamlined some aspects of 
CRA exams and made other aspects of CRA exams more rigorous and transparent. 
The agencies went too far in the direction of streamlining when they eliminated 
analyses of lending to minorities.   Analyses of lending to minorities need to be on 
CRA exams, given the persistence of significant racial disparities in lending.  If the 
regulatory agencies do not reinstate lending and service to minorities as criteria on 
CRA exams, then Congress should amend the CRA to add lending and service to 
minorities as proposed by the CRA Modernization Act of 2007.
D. Evaluation of Branching
 Ensuring that LMI consumers have access to branches and deposit accounts is 
essential to encourage them to build relationships with banks, establish savings for 
down payments and collateral requirements, and prepare themselves for acquiring 
home or small business loans.  Research conducted by the Federal Reserve Board 
demonstrated that banks offer a higher percentage of prime loans when they issue 
loans through branches rather than when they make loans through brokers.34 
30. Paul S. Calem, Kevin Gillen & Susan Wachter, The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage 
Lending, 29 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 393 (2004); Paul S. Calem, Jonathan E. Hershaff & Susan M. 
Wachter, Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate Cities, 15 Housing Pol’y 
Debate 603 (2004).
31. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Income Is No Shield Against Racial Differences in 
Lending 4 (2007), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/research/income%20is%20
no%20shield%20ii.pdf.
32. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Are Banks on the Map? 17 (2007), available at http://www.
ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter_reports/ncrc%20bank.
33. An example of this approach is employed in the evaluation of Signet Bank conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond in 1996.  See Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, Community Reinvestment Act 
Performance Evaluation of Signet Bank (Jan. 15, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
dcca/cra/1996/460024.pdf.
34. See Avery, Brevoort & Canner, supra note 19, at A128, A157–58.
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NCRC’s research for the Appalachian Regional Commission similarly reveals that 
small business lending is higher in rural counties with a greater number of bank 
branches.35  The provision of affordable products through branches is critical in as-
sisting LMI-families to build wealth through increases in home and small business 
ownership.  However, LMI and minority communities have a proliferation of payday 
lending outlets and other fringe lenders whose high fees hinder the ability to save 
and build wealth.
 Because branching and access to basic banking services are vital to wealth 
building, the CRA service exam needs to be rigorous and comprehensive, holding 
banks to a high standard of branching and service provision in LMI neighborhoods. 
Research suggests that these exams have not been sufficiently rigorous.  A study 
conducted by the Center for Community Capitalism concludes that CRA service 
test scores are likely to be inflated when low scores on the lending test and invest-
ment test confront banks with the possibility of CRA exam failure.  The Center’s 
econometric analysis is supported by qualitative analysis showing that banks with 
low lending and investment tests often receive “High Satisfactory” or better scores on 
the service test while offering few services and branches in LMI communities.36
 The Woodstock Institute found lackluster service tests that did not hold banks 
accountable for branching and for offering community development services.  For 
example, of the fourteen banks in Woodstock’s sample that had the highest scores on 
the service test, eight had branch distributions in LMI communities that were well 
below the average branch distributions for all lenders in the banks’ assessment areas. 
The exams were also inconsistent in providing data and detail on the level of bank 
services; some exams provided numbers of accounts and financial counseling semi-
nars offered while others merely mentioned that the banks provided services.37  In 
addition, as documented in the article by Marsico and Silver in this edition of the 
New York Law School Law Review, the new CRA exams for intermediate small banks 
are not adequately assessing bank branching in LMI neighborhoods.
 Diminished attention to branching for intermediate small banks and the lack-
luster nature of the large bank service test should be addressed.  The regulatory 
agencies should construct clear and objective measures for comparing the distribu-
tion of branches to the distribution of LMI neighborhoods and people in those 
neighborhoods.  The agencies should collect data on the number and percent of de-
posit accounts in LMI neighborhoods so that CRA exams contain substantive 
35. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Access to Capital and Credit for Small Businesses in 
Appalachia 5 (2007), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter_reports/ncrc%20
study%20for%20arc.pdf.
36. Michael Stegman, Kelly Cochran & Robert Faris, Brookings Inst., Creating a Scorecard 
for the CRA Service Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services Under the Community 
Reinvestment Act 5 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2003/01childrenfamilies_
stegman.aspx.
37. Woodstock Inst., Measuring the Provision of Banking Services for the Underbanked: 
Recommendations for a More Effective Community Reinvestment Act Service Test 4–7 
(2007), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/index.php?searchword=Measuring+the+Provis&opti
on=com_search&Itemid=.
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analyses on the distribution of deposit accounts instead of mere assertions that banks 
provide services to LMI people.  Similarly, including data on the number of financial 
counseling sessions and other community development services will enhance the 
rigor of community development services analyses.  
E. Data
 CRA exams cannot effectively measure banks’ performance if data is of limited 
quality.  Federal agencies have used the HMDA data in detail on exams, but further 
enhancements in the use of this data are needed.  In contrast, the agencies’ use and 
development of the CRA small business data has been lacking.
 The agencies provide detailed tables on home loan lending.  The narrative and 
tables on the CRA exams separately analyze home purchase, refinance, and home 
improvement lending.  This is necessary since the different types of home lending 
respond to different credit needs.  In other areas of analysis, however, the use of 
HMDA data should be enhanced on CRA exams.
 Loan originations should be analyzed separately from data on purchases in order 
to bolster the integrity of CRA exams and to render it more difficult for banks to 
manipulate CRA exams through the buying and selling of loans.38  According to 
community organizations, originating a loan is a more difficult task than purchasing 
a loan and should be weighted more heavily on CRA exams.  While purchasing 
loans from other institutions can be helpful to the selling institutions, enabling them 
to make additional loans, a large secondary market for purchasing loans exists. 
Moreover, originating loans is usually a more complex task involving marketing and 
outreach, counseling borrowers through the process, and underwriting.  At the least, 
these activities should be analyzed separately (in 2004 the agencies proposed sepa-
rate data tables on originations and purchases only to abandon this proposal).39
 The quality of HMDA data on loan purchases should be enhanced.  Currently, 
Regulation C (the Federal Reserve regulation that implements the HMDA statute) 
requires data on loan purchases to include the census tract location of the property 
but not the race, gender, or income of the borrower.40  Banks should be required to 
collect the same information on borrower and neighborhood characteristics on loan 
purchases as they do on loan originations.  Some banks collect complete information 
on loan purchases while others do not.  The rigor of CRA exams would be enhanced 
if data on loan purchases was made uniform.
 CRA exams should use the new pricing information in HMDA data to sepa-
rately evaluate prime and high-cost lending.  Just as home purchase and refinance 
lending responds to different credit needs so too do prime and high-cost lending. 
Also, it is important to ensure that banks making both prime and high-cost loans 
38. Purchases refer to secondary market activity involving banks buying loans from other banks, mortgage 
companies, and other types of lenders.  Loan originations refer to loans made directly by a bank.
39. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 5729, 5732 (Feb. 6, 2004) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4 (2008).
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offer a balanced product mix to LMI borrowers and communities.  This objective 
can be achieved only if prime and high-cost lending are analyzed separately.
 While a significant issue with HMDA data has been its application on CRA 
exams, the predominant issue regarding small business data is quality.  By exempting 
intermediate small banks from requirements to collect and report this data, the fed-
eral agencies effectively lowered the bar on the quality of the CRA small business 
lending data.  As NCRC demonstrated in its report for the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, intermediate small banks are an important source of credit for small 
businesses, particularly in rural areas and medium-sized cities and towns.  The agen-
cies’ decision to exempt the intermediate small banks from the reporting requirement 
negatively affects the CRA’s ability to ensure that banks consistently respond to 
credit needs, including those of small businesses.
 Limited information available on the demographics of small business borrowers 
hinders an accurate assessment of banks’ responsiveness to credit needs.  Periodic 
national surveys sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board consistently point towards 
the probability of discrimination playing a part in small business lending.41  A pow-
erful way to stop such discrimination and disparities in lending is to publicly provide 
data on the number of loans for minorities and women.  Yet, the CRA small business 
data does not specify the gender or race of the small business owner.42
 Rep. James McGovern (D-Mass.) introduced the Access and Openness in Small 
Business Lending Act of 2003 (H.R. 1748), which requires reporting the race and 
gender of the small business owner and mandates additional demographic detail in 
the CRA small business data.43  Congress should pass this bill and should either pass 
another bill or urge the regulatory agencies to reverse their decision exempting inter-
mediate small banks from the CRA small business data reporting requirements.
III. HOW TO IMPROVE CRA RATINGS
 Ratings on CRA exams are a critical element of the CRA process and also figure 
prominently in the merger application process.  A bank’s public reputation can be 
affected by positive or negative ratings.  These ratings should be awarded carefully, 
and examiners should resist inflating banks’ ratings.
CRA Grade Inflation
 As the table below shows, the current failure rate for banks has hovered between 
1 to 2% in recent years (ratings of “Needs to improve” or “Substantial non-compli-
ance” indicate a bank has failed its CRA exam).  When ratings first became publicly 
41. See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Access to Capital and Credit for Small Businesses in 
Appalachia, supra note 35, at 61–63.
42. It also lacks detail on the annual revenue of small businesses and has other limitations, such as not 
separately reporting originations from renewals of loans.
43. H.R. 1748, 108th Cong. (2003).
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available in 1990, more than 10% of banks failed their CRA exams.44  During the 
first five years of the public availability of CRA ratings, more than 5% of banks 
failed their CRA exams each year.
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
1990 340 10.9% 2,474 79.5% 280 9.0% 19 0.6% 3,113
1991 407 8.3% 4,016 81.6% 453 9.2% 46 0.9% 4,922
1992 653 12.7% 4,067 78.9% 395 7.7% 40 0.8% 5,155
1993 941 14.7% 5,060 79.3% 355 5.6% 26 0.4% 6,382
1994 1,000 18.1% 4,249 76.7% 275 5.0% 15 0.3% 5,539
1995 1,363 24.3% 4,106 73.1% 138 2.5% 7 0.1% 5,614
1996 1,214 26.5% 3,275 71.5% 81 1.8% 11 0.2% 4,581
1997 829 22.4% 2,807 75.7% 59 1.6% 11 0.3% 3,706
1998 681 18.6% 2,915 79.6% 59 1.6% 7 0.2% 3,662
1999 679 18.6% 2,915 79.7% 55 1.5% 7 0.2% 3,656
2000 220 17.5% 1,001 79.6% 30 2.4% 7 0.6% 1,258
2001 132 10.6% 1,088 87.1% 23 1.8% 6 0.5% 1,249
2002 201 9.8% 1,820 89.0% 18 0.9% 5 0.2% 2,044
2003 283 10.1% 2,492 89.2% 17 0.6% 3 0.1% 2,795
2004 329 13.1% 2,170 86.1% 17 0.7% 3 0.1% 2,519
2005 244 15.9% 1,278 83.2% 10 0.7% 4 0.3% 1,536
2006 171 13.1% 1,109 84.9% 20 1.5% 6 0.5% 1,306
2007 154 10.5% 1,292 87.8% 20 1.4% 4 0.3% 1,470
Total 9,841 16.3% 48,1374 79.5% 2,305 3.8% 227 0.4% 60,507
 Undoubtedly, banks improved their CRA performance over the years as they 
bolstered their efforts to make loans, investments, and services in LMI communities. 
However, it is implausible that a full 98% of banks have satisfied their CRA respon-
sibilities.  As discussed above, the Center for Community Capitalism found ratings 
inf lation in the CRA service tests.  In addition, Rick Marsico in his book 
44. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, http://www.ffiec.gov/craratings/default.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
Year TotalSubstantial 
Noncompliance
Outstanding Satisfactory Needs to 
Improve
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Democratizing Capital reveals how quantitative criteria are applied inconsistently on 
CRA exams, suggesting that a number of ratings cannot be justified.45
 The CRA Modernization Act contains a number of provisions that would be 
helpful for preventing grade inflation.  The first is introducing more refined ratings. 
Currently, the CRA component tests (such as the Lending Test) have “Outstanding,” 
“High Satisfactory,” “Low Satisfactory,” “Needs to improve,” and “Substantial non-
compliance” as possible grades.  In contrast, the final rating on a CRA exam can be 
one of only four grades: “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory,” “Needs to improve,” and 
“Substantial non-compliance.”  High and Low Satisfactory grades should be added 
to the overall CRA ratings system so as to allow the general public and the federal 
agencies to better assess actual differences and gradations in performance.
 If a low CRA rating in an assessment area triggered requirements for a bank to 
improve its performance, a bank would be more likely to adequately serve all geo-
graphical areas, including smaller cities and rural areas in addition to large cities. 
Currently, low CRA ratings even on a state level rarely have concrete ramifications 
for banks.  The CRA Modernization Act of 2007 would require federal agency en-
forcement to correct low ratings and would require public input in this process.  If a 
bank receives a rating of “Low satisfactory” or worse in any assessment area, the 
Modernization Act would require it to submit a CRA improvement plan to its regu-
latory agency, describing how it intends to bolster its CRA performance in that 
assessment area.46  The general public would then have an opportunity to comment 
on the CRA improvement plan.  The regulatory agency would either approve the 
CRA improvement plan or send it back to the bank for modifications.  After the 
agency approved the CRA improvement plan, a bank would be required to submit 
quarterly reports so that the regulatory agency and general public could monitor per-
formance under the terms of the plan.
V. BOLSTERING THE MERGER APPLICATION PROCESS AND PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION
 The merger application process presents significant opportunities for federal 
agencies to enforce the CRA.  Yet the enforcement of community reinvestment obli-
gations through the merger application process has been lacking over the last several 
years.  In spite of the problematic lending of the last several years, the agencies have 
refrained from mandating improvements in CRA and fair lending performance when 
considering merger applications.  Also, the agencies have been reluctant to involve 
the public in a substantive manner through public hearings and meetings.
45. See Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (2005).
46. The concept of an improvement plan builds upon a procedure mandated by the current CRA regulation. 
Section 345.43 of the FDIC’s version of the regulation states that a bank with a lower than “Satisfactory” 
rating shall allow the public to inspect a description of its efforts to “improve its performance in helping 
to meet the credit needs of its entire community.”  This description is to be updated quarterly.  12 
C.F.R. § 345.43 (2008).
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 In congressional testimony in 2007, a Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) represen-
tative testified that the FRB has held only thirteen public meetings since 1990 on 
mergers.  This is less than one meeting per year in an era in which consolidations 
have profoundly changed the banking industry.  In addition, the FRB official stated 
that since 1988, the FRB received 13,500 applications for the formation of banks or 
the merger of institutions involving bank holding companies or state-chartered banks 
that were members of the Federal Reserve System.  Yet, only twenty-five of these 
applications were denied, with eight of these denials involving consumer protection 
or community needs issues.47
 Based on the record of merger reviews described by the Federal Reserve testi-
mony to Congress, it is unlikely that mergers will be denied in the future.  However, 
the agencies can inf luence the outcome of merger applications in other ways. 
Conditional approvals have been issued in the past, requiring banks to institute non-
discriminatory and anti-predatory lending safeguards.  In addition, public hearings 
and meetings held by the regulatory agencies often facilitate mutually acceptable so-
lutions to deficiencies in bank performance.  Sometimes a bank will make a CRA 
agreement with a community group as described above.  In other instances, a bank 
will pledge to implement a new lending program or best practice that responds to a 
community concern expressed at the hearing.  Regulatory agencies may also require 
or encourage a specific reform after careful consideration of community input.  As 
the Federal Reserve official indicated in testimony, however, public hearings are 
rare.48  Conditional merger approvals have become almost non-existent in recent 
years.
 The last major merger applications that were subject to public hearings were the 
Bank of America and Fleet merger and J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank One mergers in 
2004.  In 2006, Wachovia acquired the largest lender of exotic mortgages, World 
Savings, yet there was no public hearing on this merger that posed significant fair 
lending and safety and soundness issues.  Likewise, Regions had proposed to take 
over AmSouth Bank in 2006.  Although this merger involved two of the larger 
banks in the South, the Federal Reserve declined to hold a public hearing in spite of 
the clear ramifications for the recovery of the Gulf States after Hurricane Katrina. 
More recently, the Federal Reserve declined to hold a hearing on the merger of Bank 
of New York and Mellon although the Bank of New York had received low ratings 
on two of the three tests on their two most recent CRA exams.49
47. See Bank Mergers, Community Reinvestment Act Enforcement, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and Foreclosures: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Sandra Braunstein, Director, Federal Reserve Board Division of 
Consumer and Community Affairs), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
braunstein20070521a.htm.
48. Id.
49. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., CRA Performance Evaluation of The Bank of N.Y. 3 (May 16, 2005) (giving a 
“low satisfactory” rating on lending and service tests); and Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., CRA Performance 
Evaluation of The Bank of N.Y. 3 (May 19, 2003) (giving a “low satisfactory” rating on lending and 
service tests).  In other words, the bank was close to failing on two CRA exams in succession.  Yet, no 
public hearing on the merger occurred.
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 The Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) used to require that a meeting be held 
between merging thrifts and community groups when such a meeting was requested 
by a community group that had submitted written comments pertaining to the 
merger.50  This procedure should be implemented by all the agencies.  Meetings, as 
distinguished from public hearings, usually involve a relatively small number of 
stakeholders that may include regulatory officials, community leaders, and represen-
tatives of the merging institutions.  These meetings provide valuable dialogue.
 When regulatory agencies receive several requests from community groups or 
citizens for a public forum, they should hold public hearings in addition to any meet-
ings that might take place.  Public hearings are more complex than meetings in that 
several community groups, citizens, elected officials, and others offer testimony at 
the public hearings.  Meetings allow for in-depth dialogue and debate among a 
handful of important stakeholders, but public hearings become necessary when hun-
dreds of citizens and community organizations wish to testify.  Regulatory officials 
must afford them the opportunity to testify and to explain to officials the gravity of 
a situation and the importance of a bank to the affected communities.
 Finally, the CRA Modernization Act of 2007 has a provision stopping a merger 
proceeding if a bank has a failed rating in any assessment area.51  If a bank receives a 
rating of “Needs to improve” or “Substantial non-compliance” in any assessment 
area, its regulatory agency cannot accept or approve any merger application sub-
mitted by that bank until a subsequent CRA exam issues that bank a better rating. 
This provision assures that a bank must have passing grades and reasonable CRA 
performance in all assessment areas, including smaller cities and rural areas, in addi-
tion to larger cities.  Also, the CRA Modernization Act stipulates that if a bank 
receives “Low Satisfactory” in an assessment area, its regulatory agency must con-
sider progress made in meeting the goals described in the improvement plan as an 
integral factor when reviewing a merger application.
VI. THE ADEQUACY OF FEDERAL AGENCY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION REVIEWS ON 
CRA EXAMS 
 Evidence of discriminatory and illegal lending can result in downgrades of CRA 
ratings for banks if discrimination and illegal lending were widespread and the lender 
did not take action to end the practices.  There is little evidence that the fair lending 
reviews conducted concurrently with CRA exams are rigorously testing for abusive, 
discriminatory, and illegal lending.
 In most cases, even for the largest banks in the country, the fair lending section 
of the CRA exam reports in a cursory manner that the regulatory agency tested for 
50. The OTS deleted the meeting requirement in their effort to streamline regulations for savings and 
loans.  In this instance, the streamlining was counterproductive since meetings are not burdensome and 
facilitate solutions beneficial to the financial institution and communities impacted by mergers.
51. Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 1289, 110th Cong. § 105(c)(3)(E)(v) 
(2007).
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evidence of illegal and discriminatory lending and that no such lending was found.52 
There is no detailed discussion of the types of analyses conducted to test for dis-
crimination.  
 In one instance, NCRC examined a thrift that specialized in subprime lending. 
The CRA exam report for that thrift noted that it issued a high percentage of loans 
to LMI borrowers.  The CRA fair lending review, however, did not describe whether 
or not the examiner had made any efforts to determine if the subprime lending was 
conducted in a non-discriminatory manner or was consistent with safety and sound-
ness.53  In another case, an exam mentioned that a bank specialized in adjustable rate 
lending, but the fair lending review did not mention whether the examiner assessed 
if the loans were offered in a non-discriminatory manner and whether they were safe 
and sound.54
 More detailed descriptions of fair lending reviews are necessary.  The agencies 
used to provide detailed descriptions in the fair lending section of CRA exams in the 
mid-1990s under the previous “assessment factor” format of CRA exams.  For ex-
ample, in a CRA exam dated January 1996, under Assessment Factor F, which 
assessed evidence of discriminatory or illegal practices, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond conducted matched file reviews of more than 300 loan applications made 
to Signet Bank.  The exam also described a regression analysis, which sought to de-
termine whether race was a factor in loan rejections.  The analysis considered variables 
not available in the HMDA data such as credit histories, the stability of employ-
ment, and applicant debt obligations.  This type of substantive fair lending review 
provides the general public with confidence that the regulatory agency performed a 
detailed anti-discrimination analysis.  It was after the CRA regulations were re-
formed during the mid-1990s that these descriptions of fair lending reviews 
disappeared.  As discussed above in the section about analyzing lending to minori-
ties, the agencies streamlined certain aspects of CRA exams.  In this case, the 
streamlining was counterproductive.55
 When a violation of anti-discrimination laws is discovered through fair lending 
reviews, it is common for the federal agencies to make a bank promise to eliminate 
the practice instead of lowering a CRA rating.  The CRA regulation specifies that 
examiners are to weigh the evidence and extent of a discriminatory and illegal prac-
tice when deciding whether to lower a CRA rating.56
52. For example, a federal agency had only this to say on the CRA exam’s fair lending review of one large 
bank with several affiliates, a number of which make high cost loans: “We found no evidence of illegal 
discrimination or other illegal credit practices.”  That was the only sentence in the fair lending review 
section.
53. See Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 24.
54. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., CRA Performance Evaluation of Franklin Bank, S.S.B., Cert. # 26870 
(Jan. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
55. The changes in the mid-1990’s may appear to contradict the 1996 Signet Bank exam.  The agencies’ 
changes usually take a few years to implement, meaning that the Signet exam was conducted under the 
previous exam structure.
56. See 12 C.F.R. § 345.28 (2008).
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 Some discretion in requiring corrective actions or lowering ratings is appropriate, 
but guidelines should specify when discrimination will lower ratings.  Isolated in-
stances of discrimination can be corrected through promised reforms.  On the other 
hand, widespread discrimination should result in failed ratings.  Discriminatory un-
derwriting, including prohibiting loans to row homes, redlines entire communities. 
It is ineffective and insufficient to rely on the banks’ promises to reform.  A failed 
CRA rating provides a significant deterrent against discriminatory behavior because 
a failed CRA rating prevents a bank holding company from acquiring a non-deposi-
tory financial institution as long as the rating remains in place.57  The failed rating 
can be removed after better results at the bank’s next CRA exam, provided that the 
bank undergo a thorough fair lending review, and can demonstrate that it has eradi-
cated all discriminatory practices.
VII. FREQUENCY OF CRA EXAMS FOR SMALL BANKS
 As discussed above, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) reduced the fre-
quency of small bank CRA exams.  Under the GLBA, small banks with assets of 
under $250 million are examined only once every four years if they have a 
“Satisfactory” CRA rating and once every five years if they have an “Outstanding” 
rating.58
 When small banks are examined that infrequently, they have little incentive to 
affirmatively and continually adhere to their reinvestment obligations.  They will 
have reduced incentives to make sufficient numbers of loans to LMI borrowers 
during the entire four-or five-year time period between exams, and may only focus 
their efforts during the last year or two before exams.  It is common sense that infre-
quent examinations lead to infrequent commitments to reinvestment, while more 
frequent examinations lead to more consistent commitments to reinvestment.
 This reduction in exam frequency was made in response to industry concerns 
about the “burden” of CRA exams.  The lack of a careful cost-benefit analysis is 
readily apparent in the GLBA stretch-out of the small bank CRA exam schedule. 
The small bank exam is a quick and straightforward exam that focuses on lending 
and dispenses with the investment and service test of the large bank exam.
 Despite the brevity of the exam, its importance cannot be underestimated.  In 
too many poor rural communities, the CRA exam process is the only mechanism 
that holds small banks accountable for serving LMI borrowers and communities. 
Smaller banks do not merge nearly as often as their larger counterparts, rendering 
the merger application process a seldom-used avenue for holding smaller banks ac-
countable.  Community groups are also not as prevalent in smaller rural communities 
as in large cities.  Thus, the major mechanism for holding small banks accountable is 
the CRA exam.
57. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(instituting the “have and maintain” passing rating requirement).
58. Id.
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 In their analysis on small bank burdens, the federal banking agencies have found 
that CRA regulations “impose a modest information collection burden on small in-
stitutions—an average of 10 burden hours per institution per year.”59  In addition, the 
relatively few trade articles on small bank CRA exams also reveal few complaints 
about their burden.  In fact, an American Banker article shortly after the CRA regu-
lation reform in 1995, titled “Small Banks Give Thumbs-Up to Streamlined CRA 
Exams,” quotes small bankers as saying that the exams were not burdensome and 
that the CRA examiners took less than one day of their time.60
VIII. THE NEED TO EXTEND CRA TO NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
 In the thirty years since the CRA’s enactment, the financial industry has changed 
in profound ways.  Banks now face more formidable competitors, including indepen-
dent mortgage companies and large credit unions, than they did in 1977.  These 
competitors are not now covered by the CRA.  As long as these lenders remain un-
covered, it is likely that their lending will be less safe and sound than the banks’ or 
that they will offer a smaller portion of loans to LMI communities than banks do. 
Above, we describe how credit unions and independent mortgage companies do not 
offer as large a percentage of home loans to LMI borrowers as banks.  NCRC’s fair 
lending investigation discussed above revealed that twenty-six of the thirty-five in-
stitutions engaged in redlining and other discriminatory practices were independent 
mortgage companies not covered by the CRA.61
 Congress should look to the example of the state of Massachusetts.  Massachusetts 
has required credit unions to comply with the CRA.  The state has also recently 
enacted a community reinvestment requirement for mortgage companies.62  The 
CRA Modernization Act of 2007 would likewise require the application of the CRA 
to independent mortgage companies.63
 The CRA Modernization Act of 2007 would also require the application of the 
CRA to insurance companies and would impose HMDA-like data disclosure re-
quirements on insurance companies.  A number of states already collect data on 
insurance provisions and provide this data to the general public.64  After the denials 
of insurance for victims of Hurricane Katrina, the time has come to shine a public 
59. Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,083 (May 28, 1999).
60. Jaret Seiberg, Small Banks Give Thumbs-Up to Streamlined CRA Exams, Am. Banker, Feb. 1, 1996, at 
4.
61. Id.
62. H. 4387, 185th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007).
63. Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 1289, 110th Cong. (2007).
64. See Gregory D. Squires, Sally O’Connor & Josh Silver, The Unavailability of Information on Insurance 
Unavailability: Insurance Redlining and the Absence of Geocoded Disclosure Data 12 Housing Pol’y 
Debate, 347, 352 (2001) (finding that eight states require property insurers to provide at least some 
geocoded data to the state, and of those states, four make the data available to the public).
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spotlight on the practices of insurance companies and the distribution of their poli-
cies based on certain characteristics of consumers and communities.65
 Finally, the CRA Modernization Act of 2007 would require the application of 
the CRA to securities firms.  CRA exams would measure the extent to which secu-
rities firms are serving LMI and minority consumers.  Wealth-building would be 
augmented considerably if more people of modest means and more minorities had 
access to mutual funds and other similar products.  In addition, if a law channeled 
more security firm investments into minority and working class neighborhoods, the 
economic development prospects of these communities would be significantly en-
hanced.
CONCLUSION
 In light of the present day lending crisis and its disparate impact on minority and 
low- and moderate-income communities, the CRA must be modernized and en-
hanced to apply to non-bank financial institutions.  The CRA has been effective in 
bringing about $5 trillion of loans, investments, and services in CRA agreements to 
LMI communities.  Yet, too many LMI and minority communities still remain left 
out of the financial mainstream under the current construct.  For America to truly 
become a financially inclusive society, the federal agencies’ application of the CRA 
to banks needs strengthening, and the CRA must also be applied to non-bank finan-
cial institutions.
 The CRA has great potential to act as an antidote to the foreclosure crisis by 
requiring all financial institutions to safely and soundly serve minority and LMI 
communities.
 As described in detail above, the following steps must be taken to bolster CRA’s 
effectiveness in increasing access to credit and capital for minorities and low- and 
moderate-income communities.
1. Extend the CRA to cover non-depository institutions, including:
Credit Unions• 
Securities Companies • 
Mortgage Companies• 
Insurance Firms• 
Investment Banks• 
2. Agency Oversight:
The CRA’s scrutiny of illegal and predatory lending practices must become more • 
transparent and rigorous.  Evidence of widespread discriminatory practices must 
result in downgrades in CRA ratings.
The agencies must hold more public hearings on merger applications and issue • 
more conditional merger approvals.
65. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Small Clause, Big Problem, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2006, at C1.
225
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
Low scores for any assessment area must trigger regulatory enforcement, in-• 
cluding the submission of improvement plans and heightened attention during 
the merger application process.
The stretch-out of the small bank CRA exam cycle should be eliminated.  Small • 
banks should be examined as frequently as large banks.
3. Reform CRA assessment areas and affiliate procedures:
Assessment area procedures must be reformed so that a great majority of a bank’s • 
loans are on CRA exams.
All non-depository affiliates of banks must be included on CRA exams.• 
4. Refinement of CRA examination criteria:
CRA exams must explicitly consider lending, investments, and services to mi-• 
nority borrowers and communities.
Federal agencies must enhance the rigor of the service test and increase data col-• 
lection of bank deposit accounts, at least by income level of neighborhood.
The community development test of mid-size banks must do a better job as-• 
sessing the provision of bank branches and services in LMI neighborhoods.
CRA exams must separately consider purchases and loan originations.• 
CRA exams must also separately consider prime and high-cost lending.• 
The quality of CRA small business data needs to be enhanced through the dis-• 
closure of the race and gender of the small business owner.
CRA grade inflation needs to be counteracted by increasing the number of pos-• 
sible ratings.
